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Lucy S. McGough"
Lauren Cangelosi"
I went in as a boy
And came out as a man
With a messed up attitude
And a messed up head.
I was taught to hate without pause
And now the people look at me and say,
"You're a lost cause."'
This poem was written by an adolescent who was committed to
the State Department of Public Safety & Corrections by a Louisiana
juvenile court and sent to serve his time in a juvenile institution. The
question is fairly raised whether John and other adolescents like him
are in fact lost causes, doomed to a nine-out-of-ten chance of
returning to prison,2 and a life of lost opportunities. Some critics
have expanded the question to ask if the juvenile courts and the entire
juvenile justice system of individualized treatment and rehabilitation
are lost causes. They seek the abolition of the juvenile courts and a
return to trying delinquents in the criminal courts.3 Some child
advocates offer only faint defense of the current system.4 Others
charge that the constitutionalization of the juvenile process that
occurred a half-century ago has faded to a mockery of constitutional
guarantees and that constitutionalization is itself a lost cause.5 Is
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1. "John," Hate Without a Pause, in 2 Ya Heard Me 12 (2001), available at
http://www.jjpl.org/PDF/YaHeardMe2.pdf. Johns's poem was originally included
in the Creative Arts Journal of Incarcerated Youth and describes his experience in
the system.
2. Cecile C. Guin, Juvenile to Adult Criminality (1991) (Ph.D. dissertation,
The University of Texas at Arlington) (UMI ProQuest Digital Dissertations
publication no. AAT 9131745).
3. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness,
Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 68
(1998).
4. Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the
Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 163 (1993).
5. The recent changes in juvenile court jurisdiction, sentencing, and
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there any hope that the juvenile justice system can replenish its
idealism, that legislators and judges and critics and advocates can find
a way to reinvent the juvenile courts?
Rather miraculously a reform movement germinated in Louisiana
in 2001. Perhaps the first official signal of change came when Chief
Justice Pascal Calogero appealed for "all three branches to examine
the issue of the current state of our juvenile justice system and to take
bold steps to improve it. '  Three years later with the prodding of
many veteran juvenile justice reformers, backed by some unexpected
new allies, as well as the threats of continuing journalistic exposes
and federal lawsuits, the legislature responded. (Some might say the
legislature capitulated.). Louisiana moved tojoin the handful of other
states that confer an absolute right to counsel for children accused of
serious delinquent acts.7 In addition, the legislature tightened the
requirements for demonstrating that a knowing and voluntary waiver
of counsel has occurred. The trial court must now explicitly inquire
into the child's competency level, taking into account the possibility
that the child may be suffering from some developmental disability.'
Though unheralded by the press, this rather amazing occurrence in
the legislature may signal a renewal of the state's commitment to its
procedures reflect ambivalence about the role ofjuvenile courts and the control of
children. As juvenile courts converge procedurally and substantively with criminal
courts, is there any reason to maintain a separate court whose only distinctions are
procedures under which no adult would agree to be tried? See Barry Feld, The
Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 691, 722 (1991).
6. Chief Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2001
State of the Judiciary Address to the Joint Session of the House and Senate of the
Louisiana Legislature (April 10, 2001), available at
www.lasc.org/press room/press releases/2001/2001-05.asp. Chief Justice
Calogero's address is quoted in H.C.R. 56, 2003 Leg. Reg. Sess. (La. 2003).
7. Louisiana Acts Number 776, section 1 of 2004 amends Children's Code
article 81 0D(2) by providing that a child may not waive the assistance of counsel
if she is accused of a felony-grade offense. See 2004 La. Acts No. 776, § 1; La. Ch.
Code art. 8101D(2). The other states that prohibit waiver are Iowa and Texas. It
appears that at least eleven states only permit waiver along with the concurrence of
some sort of authority figure, including a parent, guardian, attorney, or the court
itself, while twenty-five states freely allow juvenile waiver. The law of the
remaining eleven states is not clear as to what type of waiver is allowed or
prohibited. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Juveniles' Waiver of the Right to Counsel,
ABA Criminal Justice Magazine, Spring 1998. Many reform bodies, however, have
long recommended non-waiver. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
8. In separate legislation, again on recommendation of the Louisiana State
Law Institute and the Children's Code Advisory Committee, the legislature
expanded the definition of competency to stand trial in juvenile court and added
greater protections to the competency determination process. See La. Ch. Code art.
804 (as amended by 2004 La. Acts No. 485, § 1).
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system of juvenile courts and is another manifestation of a larger
concern for its juvenile justice system.9
In this article we will explore why this reform is so overdue, the
arguments for and against juvenile waivers of counsel, the sources of
political pressure that finally nudged philosophically resistant
legislators to endorse the measure, and address the critical yet
unresolved issues emanating from this new entitlement.
II. A SPECIALIZED COURT IN THE SHADOW OF DUE PROCESS
Today's political and social environment that produced the 2004
non-waiver of counsel statute strikingly parallels that of Chicago in
1898 when the statute creating the first juvenile court was enacted.'1
Two widely publicized public concerns coalesced to produce the
reform: reports of dangerous conditions of juvenile imprisonment,
and scientific findings casting doubt on juvenile decision-making and
judgmental competency. The original juvenile court statute did not
mention anything about an accused child's right to counsel. Indeed,
the court was to be a sui generis institution, if anything modeled more
on the practice of medicine than on the practice of law. The original
statute called for separate dockets and case files, thus shielding the
court's records from public view, and focused on rehabilitation rather
than punishment. The heart of the court's operations was the
disposition hearing: miscreant children were to be diagnosed and then
cured by probation or other individualized rehabilitative treatment
ordered by the court. The trial process was not described at all in the
statute, though it was clear to all who worked for the bill's passage
that this institution would function quite unlike a criminal trial court.
Reformers referred to the court as a "parental" court" or a "court for
children." t 2 Within twenty years of the institution of the Chicago
9. See Vicki Ferstel, Juvenile Reform Bills Clear Committees, The Advocate
(Baton Rouge, La.), May 13, 2004, at 6A; Mark Ballard, Blanco Quickly Signs
Juvenile Justice Bill, The Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), May 6, 2004, at 1 OA;
Lawmakers Move Justice Legislation, The Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), April 15,
2004, at 9A.
10. See An Act To Regulate the Treatment and Control of Dependent,
Neglected andDelinquent Children, Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 111. Laws 133
(amended 1907).
11. A characterization coined by Lucy Flower, President of the Chicago
Women's Club and influential advocate for the new court. See David S. Tanenhaus,
Juvenile Justice in the Making 4 (2004).
12. "What we should have, in our systems of criminal justice is an entirely
separate system of courts for children, in large cities, who commit offenses which
could be criminal in adults." Frederick H. Wines, Address, Fifteenth Biennial
Report, Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities (Springfield, 111.1899)
(quoted in Tanenhaus, supra note 11). Wines was the Secretary of the Illinois State
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juvenile court, every state had enacted similar legislation. The
Louisiana statute creating a separate court for juveniles in Orleans
Parish was enacted in 1908.'3
The juvenile court system was born out of the Progressive
movement, which emerged around the turn of the twentieth century
in response to the social problems caused by rapid industrialization,
urbanization, and modernization. 4 Progressivism encompassed many
ideologies, but one of its unifying themes was that professionals and
experts could develop rational and scientific solutions to social
problems that would be administered by the state. Many Progressive
legislative programs shared a child-centered focus; these laws came
to be known as "child-saving" laws, which included child labor laws,
child welfare laws, compulsory school attendance laws, and the
juvenile court system. 5 The Progressives' vision of the new court
was that the services of the court were more important than its
adjudicatory process, that it should be a procedurally lax court with
"individualized, offender-oriented dispositional practices," which
would help further protective and rehabilitative goals.' 6
Although it was called a "court," the delinquency trials were more
similar to the processes of a bureaucratic agency than a criminal
tribunal. The court was to be staffed with experts, who would
diagnose and then meet the individualized needs of the "cfiild at
risk. ' ' 7 The juvenile judge on the recommendation of probation staff
made discretionary treatment decisions by substituting a scientific and
preventative approach for the traditional punitive philosophy of
criminal law." Whether the juvenile had actually committed the
offense causing him to be haled before the court was important but
apparently not essential for intervention. Courts often used a smoke-
fire syllogism for justifying an allotment of treatment. If a child was
arrested in the company of delinquents known to the court or if he
was caught near the scene of a crime or simply idling about a high
crime area, some judges might stretch skinny proof of every element
Board of Charities.
13. See 1908 La. Acts No. 83, § 14. Paragraph A explicitly recognized that the
right to counsel is in play for the formal adversarial proceedings in the juvenile
court. Thus, this statute was one of the first to recognize the right of a child to be
represented by retained counsel although it did not impose any public obligation to
provide and pay for such assistance.
14. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
471, 474 (1987).
15. Barry C. Feld, Justice for Children: The Right to Counsel and the Juvenile
Courts 10 (1993)
16. Feld, supra note 14, at 472
17. Feld, supra note 15, at 12.
18. Id.
1128 [Vol. 65
2005] LUCY S. MCGOUGH & LAUREN CANGELOSI
of an offense in the name of administering a preventive dose of
treatment, thus "saving" him from a future life of crime.
The first concern that prompted the creation of the juvenile court
was that young children and adolescents were not yet morally
accountable for their behavior. The Progressives viewed them as
vulnerable and malleable beings whose irrationality and lack of
judgment prevented competent decision-making and moral
understanding. The creation of the new scientific discipline of
developmental psychology which occurred in the 1880s lent
"legitimacy to the idea that children were qualitatively different from
adults." 19 Interestingly, one of the components of the reformers'
design of the Cook County (Chicago) Juvenile Court was a research
center that would have access to court files and be able to interview
children coming before the court with the purpose of determining the
predominant causes of delinquency among recidivists. The Director
of what came to be known as the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute later
published an influential article, The Individual Study of the Young
Criminal, which postulated -that environmental factors heavily
contributed to delinquency; that individualized treatment plans were
essential to rehabilitation; and that children's developmental deficits
warranted a nonpunitive social response.2"
The second concern contributing to the climate of reform in turn-
of- the-century Chicago was the discovery of dangerous conditions of
confinement for children found to have committed a crime. One
reformer searching the records of 1882 found that of the 7,566
convicts in the House of Corrections, 263 (3.5%) were fourteen years
old or younger, including twenty children who were younger than
eleven. Most had been arrested for being homeless or wandering the
streets and should never have been imprisoned. 2' Further, the
conditions of the House of Corrections were bleak: "There are no
healthful influences brought to bear on these youthful offenders,
neither physically nor morally.... It is not a house of correction with
them-it is a house of perversion, corruption and retrogression for
19. Tanenhaus, supra note 11, at 116. Professor G. Stanley Hall is considered
the father of child psychology. His seminal book, Adolescence: Its Psychology and
Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and
Education, was published in 1904. See G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence: Its
Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime,
Religion and Education (1904).
20. William Healy, The Individual Study of the Young Criminal, 1 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 50 (1910). See Tanenhaus, supra note 11, at 111-37.
21. John P. Altgeld, Live Questions Including Our Penal Machinery and Its
Victims 164 (1890) (quoted in Tanenhaus, supra note 11, at 8).
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them."22 Conditions were so bad that several Chicago judges refused
to send children to the institution. 23
After a half-century of operation, the first constitutional challenge
to the procedural laxity of the juvenile courts was presented to the
United States Supreme Court,24 but the first full-blown consideration
of whether state juvenile courts were subject to constitutional
constraints came in 1967 with the famous Gault case.25 The case
began with the arrest of fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault in Phoenix,
Arizona, for allegedly making an obscene telephone call to a
neighbor. He was taken into custody, detained overnight without
notification to his parents, and made to appear at a hearing the
following day. At no time was Gerald assisted by an attorney or
advised of the right to counsel. Furthermore, Gerald was questioned
at trial26 without having been advised of his privilege against self-
incrimination. The evidence supportinghis adjudication consisted of
the hearsay allegations of the neighbor" as reported by the probation
officer and perhaps Gerald's own admission." The judge committed
him as a juvenile delinquent to the state industrial school for the
22. "Boys Made Criminal by Confinement at the Bridewell," c. 1893 (quoted
in Tanenhaus, supra note 11, at 9-10).
23. Tanenhaus, supra note 11, at 8-9. History does repeat itself. Judge Mark
Doherty of the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court ordered the release of five adolescent
inmates whom he had previously committed to the custody of the Department of
Public Safety & Corrections. The Department, in turn, had placed then in the
Swanson Correctional Center for Youth-Madison Parish, widely known simply as
"Tallulah" for the community in which it is located. After hearing testimony by the
inmates of physical and sexual attacks, the court found that there was evidence of
rampant violence and that the prison conditions were unconstitutional. See State ex
rel. S.D., 2002-0672 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2002), 832 So. 2d 415; Teen Inmate
Testifies of Beatings at Tallulah Prison, Southwest Daily News, Apr. 15, 2003, at
2; see also Fox Butterfield, Hard Time: A Special Report: Profits at Juvenile
Prison Come with a Chilling Cost, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1998, at A14.
24. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045 (1966)
(challenging the adequacy of a District of Columbia statute authorizing the trial of
a juvenile in adult criminal court and finding the statute deficient under the Due
Process Clause).
25. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
26. Apparently, Gerald was not interrogated before trial. For a discussion of
this issue, see supra Part II.
27. See Charles E. Springer, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 Notre Dame
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 397,405 n. 36 (1991) ("Gault involved the notorious Jerry
Gault, who was accused of making an obscene phone call. ('Have you got big
bombers?') He denied it.").
28. There was a dispute concerning whether Gerald admitted the charges. The
probation officer and judge testified at the later habeas corpus hearing that Gerald
did admit to making at least some of the alleged statements. In contrast, his mother
recalled that he had admitted simply dialing the number while another teenager
actually spoke to the neighbor. Gault, 387 U.S. at 6, 87 S. Ct. at 1432.
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remainder of his minority, then set at age twenty-one. Under
Arizona law, an adult's use of "vulgar, abusive or obscene language"
in the presence of a woman or a child constituted a misdemeanor and
was punishable by a fine not exceeding fifty dollars or imprisonment
for not more than two months.3°
Although the state argued that Gerald was amply represented by
the court, the probation officer and his parents-all of whom had his
best interests in mind-the Supreme Court expressly rejected those
counsel-substitutes. All of those actors had conflicts of interest.3"
More broadly in what is surely Justice Fortas' most famous writing,
the Court required the appointment of counsel as a matter of due
process of law:
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to
insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain
whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The
child 'requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him.'
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that in respect to proceedings to
determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an
institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the
child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be
represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable
to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent
the child.32
The Court's opinion makes it clear that the justices were
discouraged by failure of the juvenile courts' lack of institutional
promise. If the trade-off for the lack of adversarial trial regularity was
an enhanced environmental opportunity for rehabilitating young
offenders, then children had paid far too great a price over the past
half-century. The Court noted the relentlessly high crime rates among
juveniles as well as high recidivism rates (nationwide found to be
29. See id. at 3, 87 S. Ct. at 1431.
30. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 8-9, 87 S. Ct. at 1434; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. §
13-377 (1964) (repealed).
31. See Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428.
32. Id. at 36, 41, 87 S. Ct. at 1448, 1451. In addition to the requirement of
counsel, the Court went on to hold that due process required that accused juveniles
in the juvenile courts also must be given notice of charges, respect for the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to confrontation and cross-examination, and the
right to summon witnesses in his or her own behalf. Id. at 42-57, 87 S. Ct. at
1451-59.
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sixty-six percent ).33 The Court also noted that the lenient treatment
model of the early court had been replaced by lengthy institutional
confinement, possibly for a child's entire minority as was the case
with Gerald Gault's dispositional order.
In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution
did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of
care implied in the phrase "due process." Under our
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court.34
1I. STATE STATUTES GOVERNING WAIVER OF COUNSEL
In the immediate aftermath of Gault, states that had not
previously provided for counsel in juvenile court proceedings
amended their statutes to do so. Providing for the assistance of
counsel if a family requested it and, perhaps more importantly,
paying for such assistance for needy families, was an important
obligation for states to acknowledge. Yet the heart of the right to
counsel turned out to be the answer to the question, how easy was it
to lose it? Was the right to counsel waivable? Did the rather
minimal rules of criminal procedure govern waivability or was more
ceremony required before a court accepted a child's waiver? Was the
right personally possessed by the child or could a parent or caretaker
waive it on his behalf? Today in many states, fewer than half of the
accused juveniles are represented by counsel at trial because the
others have waived representation.35 The Louisiana experience with
waivers of counsel mirrors national ambivalence.36
33. Id. at 22, 87 S. Ct. at 1441.
34. Id. at 27-28, 87 S. Ct. at 1443-44. There has been only one juvenile right
to counsel decision by the Supreme Court since Gault, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707, 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979). See infra text accompanying note 110. In all other
claims of constitutional rights in juvenile court proceedings, the court has stopped
short of imposing the criminal justice procedural paradigm upon the juvenile courts
and was subsequently emboldened to analyze every child's claim to a constitutional
trial right guaranteed to an adult accused on a case by case basis, invariably taking
into account the special institutional structure of the juvenile court. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970) (holding that state's burden is the
same in both a delinquency and criminal proceeding: beyond a reasonable doubt);
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975) (holding that accused
delinquent possesses the same protection against double jeopardy as does a
criminally accused adult); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976
(1971) (holding that unlike a criminal court, a juvenile court could try accused
juveniles without a jury).
35. Tory J. Caeti, et al., Juvenile Right to Counsel: A National Comparison
of State Legal Codes, 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 611, 617 (1995).
36. Gabriella Celeste & Patricia Puritz, The Children Left Behind: An
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There are four broad approaches to waivers of counsel taken by
American jurisdictions, with some significant variations within
categories. The first position is that the general rule governing the
acceptance of waivers from accused adults should be applied to
juveniles: the court makes a determination of knowing and voluntary
decision-making on a case-by-case or totality of the circumstances
basis. This "adult rule" view is the probable majority view today.37
The second "adult consultation" approach is a special juvenile waiver
rule exemplified by Louisiana's former statute; it requires
consultation with either a concerned adult (usually a parent) or
attorney before any decision is made and presented by the juvenile to
the court for acceptance. The third possibility is that while juvenile
waivers deserve special scrutiny, no apriori test can be devised that
will take into account all of the potential pressures that might
coalesce to make counsel a necessity in a particular case. This
approach is the "juvenile totality of circumstances" rule. Finally, the
"no waiver" rule takes aper se stance: waiver of counsel is such a
serious decision that it should be prohibited altogether when a child
is charged with an offense carrying the possibility of a loss of liberty
rule. 38
The trial court's independent inquiry confirming that the waiver
of counsel is made knowingly and voluntarily is constitutionally
required39 and thus is universally binding on states. Arguably, the
same standards governing waivability of constitutional rights ought
to govern both criminal and delinquency proceedings. 40 According
to Supreme Court precedent, the prerequisites for a valid waiver of
Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency
Proceedings in Louisiana 2 (2001), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/LAreport.pdf.
37. Shepherd, supra note 7. See also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Still Seeking the
Promise of Gault: Juveniles and the Right to Counsel, ABA Criminal Justice
Magazine, Summer 2003.
38. Variations include differentiating between younger and older children: for
example, forbidding waivers by children under the age of twelve but using a totality
test for waivers offered by older children or differentiating between rules depending
on the severity of the offense, as exemplified by the legislative compromise
resulting in the 2004 amendments of Louisiana Children's Code article 810.
39. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969). For further
discussion, see State in the Interest ofJ G., 96-718 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996), 684
So.2d 563.
40. Arguably, relinquishing consultation with counsel before entering a guilty
plea should entail the most stringent precautions since the defendant is waiving both
counsel and the right to a trial. In Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948), a
plurality of the court held that the court should employ a "penetrating and
comprehensive examination of all the circumstances," including lesser included
offenses, potential punishments, possible defenses to the changes and mitigating
circumstances.
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counsel by an adult vary depending upon the stage of the criminal
proceeding. Clearly, less is required when a defendant foregoes the
assistance of counsel during interrogation4' than when he refuses
counsel at trial. In Boykin v. Alabama the Court likened a waiver of
trial counsel to an entry of a guilty plea by adopting the same test for
both determinations. Just as the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee a right to counsel in all criminal proceedings,
so an accused adult criminal can waive representation and insist upon
the correlative right to proceed to trial pro se.43 Reasoning that the
Sixth Amendment implied a right of self-representation and that
historically, "assistance" of counsel was an option to be exercised or
not by an accused, the Supreme Court held that a state cannot impose
counsel upon an unwilling defendant." Nonetheless, it ringed this
recognition with several caveats. The trial court must warn of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation; the accused must be
literate, competent, understanding and capable of exercising informed
free will; and the accused must be competent enough to be said to act
voluntarily; and the court may be well advised to appoint advisory
counsel as a stand-by resource for a defendant who becomes confused
by trial procedure.4
Thus, some have questioned whether prohibiting waiver by a
juvenile is a violation of the juvenile's rights under the Sixth
Amendment. In Faretta, the court found that the founders had placed
higher value on the right of free choice than on assurance of a fair
trial.46 Unlike the adult accused patriots whom the founders were
41. A waiver of counsel during pretrial interrogation must be voluntary and
knowing. The voluntariness requirement is met by a showing of an absence of
police coercion. Colorado v. Connally, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). The knowledge
requirement is satisfied by an understanding of the Miranda rights. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). After receiving the Miranda warnings, a
defendant must invoke his right to counsel in order to be fully protected until
counsel is retained or appointed. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
42. Justice Douglas warned:
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must
show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected
the offer. Anything less is not waiver." We think that the same standard
must be applied to determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made.
For, as we have said, a plea of guilty is more than an admission of
conduct; it is a conviction.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S. Ct. at 1712 (quoting Carnley v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S. Ct. 884, 890 (1962)).
43. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).
44. Id. at 832-36, 95 S. Ct. at 2539-41.
45. Id. at 834-36 & n. 46, 95 S. Ct. at 2541 & n. 46. See also Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938).
46. 422 U.S. at 833-34, 95 S. Ct. at 2540.
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concerned about, however, children have never been accorded the
right of free choice in either the common law or civilian tradition.47
As the West Virginia Supreme Court put it: It would be a
"contradiction that an infant might waive his constitutional right to
counsel in proceedings wherein his very liberty interest is threatened,
but not do so if someone is about to force sale of a piece of land in
which he owns even a $1.00 interest., 48  From Rome forward,
civilized peoples have refused to permit a child to possess, in the
words of one Louisiana juvenile judge, the "adult right of making
risky decisions."'4
Florida is an example of a jurisdiction that simply codified the
adult standard by requiring the court to offer counsel and make a
"thorough inquiry" to ensure that the "choice intelligently and
understandingly has been made."5 ° Without specific guidelines,
however, such a statute does not ensure that only competent, fully
informed juveniles relinquish their right to counsel.5 1  In JR. V v.
State,52 a juvenile waived counsel and entered a guilty plea. At a later
hearing to withdraw his plea, the juvenile consistently responded "not
really" when asked if he understood what was happening at the
hearing.53 Evidence was introduced that the juvenile was impaired
by a learning deficit due to brain damage and emotional, mental and
physical disabilities resulting from a car accident six years before.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that the juvenile "answered all of
the appropriate questions in the [?,lea] colloquy satisfactorily."54 The
Florida Supreme Court reversed. 5 The standard adopted by the New
York juvenile waiver of counsel statute is somewhat more protective
in that it requires clear and convincing evidence of waiver, and the
court must find that acceptance of the waiver is in the child's best
interests.56
But no matter how phrased, the guidelines for any exchange
between the court and the child are likely to serve as ineffective
47. See, e.g., Penelope Alysse Brobst, The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh
Away: State v. Fernandez-Returning Louisiana's Children to an Adult Standard,
60 La.L.Rev. 605, 628 (2000).
48. State ex rel. J.M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1981).
49. Testimony submitted by Judge Paul Young, Caddo Parish Juvenile Court,
to the Commission on Juvenile Justice (February 3, 2003) (on file with the
Commission and with the first author).
50. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.165 (West 2003).
51. Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction ofJuvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the
Juvenile Courts, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 577 (2002).
52. J.R.V. v. State, 715 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. App. 5th Dist. 1998).
53. Id. at 1138.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1139.
56. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 249-a (West 2003).
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means of discovering whether the child truly understands the
magnitude of his risk when counsel is waived. Developmental
scientists concur that children display accommodation and commonly
may acquiesce in what they perceive as the desired answer when
asked by an adult, perhaps especially when the adult is a commanding
figure swathed in robes and surrounded by other regal trappings. 5
Furthermore, on busy trial days when pleas are scheduled, rarely is
enough time set aside for questions in a thorough, unhurried effort to
instruct the child as well as probe answers for any hints of
misunderstanding or ignorance.5" While undoubtedly it is important
that the waiver instructions are reinforced by the court, the real
teaching through to understanding is more efficiently achieved in a
one-on-one session between the child and a knowledgeable adult who
knows the facts of the accusation and can counsel and weigh options
with the child.
The "adult consultation" rule provides some additional protection
for accused children. It was the approach adopted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court and codified by the Louisiana Children's Code which
became effective in 1992.59 Article 810 permitted waiver of counsel
by most accused delinquents if three prerequisites were met: (1) the
child has consulted with either an attorney "or other adult interested
in the child's welfare," (2) both the child and the adult advisor have
been instructed by the court about the child's rights and the possible
consequences of waiver, and (3) the court finds that the child's waiver
57. Although there is a developmental trend with younger children displaying
more social conformity than older children, even adolescents are likely to be
swayed by authoritative adults. See Lucy S. McGough, Fragile Voices 68-73
(1994) (summarizing the social science research literature).
58. This statement was taken from an observer of a Louisiana district court
hearing regarding juvenile delinquency:
In chambers the judge would review the waiver form with the parent and
ask the parent if the child wished to waive. ... It was clear that the ADA
and the judge wanted the children to waive counsel and admit the offenses.
•... The process of waiver and admission often took less than five
minutes.
Celeste, supra note 36 at 60.
59. The rights identified in the Gault decision were recognized by Art. 95 of
the Louisiana Code of Juvenile Procedure of 1978. Article 96 permitted a child to
waive counsel with consent of the court and his parent. That same year the
Louisiana Supreme Court decided State in the Interest ofDino, 359 So.2d 586 (La.
1978), a case involving ajuvenile's waiver of counsel during an interrogation. The
Court reversed a conviction based on the use of the child's confession, holding that
consultation with a parent or other adult interested in the child's welfare before such
a waiver of counsel at interrogation would be effective. Article 810 of the
Children's Code imported that rule for all waivers of counsel, even a waiver of
counsel at trial. That choice has caused much mischief.
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is voluntary, free from physical or mental coercion.60 The heart of the
consultation requirement is the identification of which adult can best
play this advisory role: the child's parent, a nonlawyer guardian, a
special lawyer appointed for this limited purpose or trial counsel? In
states that have required a showing of consultation as the sine qua
non for waiver, there is variance of choice.
The counseling requirement suggests that this adult should be
both knowledgeable (about the legal processes and the facts of the
child's particular accusation) and concerned about the child's fate.
But if only those two characteristics were met, one might expect that
the ideal advisor would be the child's parent/custodian/family
member who is a lawyer and has some familiarity with the juvenile
courts in his or her practice. Yet most lawyers confess that they
would be disastrous as counsel for their children because they lack
professional objectivity and might have difficulty extracting a true
account from their offspring. Their personal relationship is likely to
get in the way of their professional relationship as counsel.
Consequently, the characterization of the ideal representative is a
knowledgeable lawyer, concerned yet objective about the child's
predicament.
With this template in hand, we should discard the choice of both
a nonlawyer guardian6 and a lawyer appointed for the limited
purpose of advising a juvenile whether to waive counsel at trial. The
guardian would lack the training in the elements of a crime and other
knowledge essential to the child's successful defense to the
accusation. Consequently, the value of the assistance of counsel
would be lost. Special counsel might well successfully play the
limited role of advising a child about his of her trial rights, but is
unlikely to have investigated the accusation or evaluated possible
dispositional alternatives to the extent necessary to make an educated
choice about trial strategy. Alternatively of course, a conscientious
professional might well believe that the only ethical stance would be
to instruct the child about the consequences of waiver and advise
every child to demand counsel. However, costs and efficient
scheduling are likely to induce the appointment of special counsel
who is a court-attached functionary, required to conduct many waiver
conferences each day, with little commitment or continuing
60. La. Ch. Code art. 810(A). A child who may be mentally ill could not waive
counsel. La. Ch.Code art. 810(D). As discussed below, if the court found a conflict
in interests between the child and adult advisor, the court was required to reject the
proffered waiver and make the appointment.
61. In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979), the Supreme
Court analyzed the unique relationship between lawyer and client and isolated three
elements that made advice critical to an accused: a knowledge of the law; the duty
of exclusive fidelity; and a relationship of trust and confidence.
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responsibility for any one of those children. Furthermore, the
presence of a special advisory counselor would probably confuse the
child if the relationship ended with the initial conference and
thereafter, a different trial lawyer was appointed for subsequent
hearings.
The choice distills to one between an instructed family member
or trial counsel. The former Louisiana provision clearly confined the
counseling appointment option to either defense counsel or, in most
cases, a family member: "other adult interested in the child's
welfare., 6' The characterization "other adult interested in the child's
welfare" perhaps captures the element of a concerned adult,63 but it
completely fails to ensure that such an adult is fully knowledgeable
and also may not ensure objectivity. The former Louisiana provision
sought to ensure a knowledgeable adult by requiring the court to give
the minimal Boykin instructions to both the child and the adult
advisor. Without full knowledge of the law and legal processes,
however, the adult cannot adequately advise the child whether to
waive or demand counsel. The West Virginia Supreme Court
struggled with whether to embrace an "interested adult" consultation
requirement and identified these objections:
[A] parent or other adult, even one intensely involved in and
interested in a child's welfare, may not be sufficiently
knowledgeable, educated or informed about constitutional law
to competently waive protections. Sometimes parents'
interests may even be opposite a child's .... 64
The question of the adequacy of parental assistance during waiver
decision-making is indeed troublesome. Certainly a parent may be a
trusted confident, but there are all sorts of potential conflicts of
interests. There may be moral conflicts as when the parent instigated
or aided the child in the commission of the alleged delinquent act, or
the child's defense exposes the parent to prosecution or to civil suit
or surfaces family secrets.6 ' Less obvious conflicts can also arise
62. La. Ch. Code art. 810 (repealed 2004).
63. Certainly it could be argued that a probation officer or other person who
would have divided loyalties might meet the vague requirement of the former
statute, and thus the statutory test was even more pernicious than indicated in the
discussion of the text. As the West Virginia Supreme Court observed trenchantly,
"Courts have often had difficulty defining an 'interested adult.' Is a probation
officer an interested adult? Is a grandparent? Is a parent who initiated the
complaint? Or is drunk? Or is apathetic?" State ex rel. J.M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d
199, 203 (1981).
64. Id. at 203.
65. Louisiana Children's Code article 810(C) rather easily responds to this
concern by prohibiting waiver of counsel if the interests of the child and parent
conflict "or appointment of counsel is otherwise required in the interests ofjustice."
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from the parent's obligation to pay for any counsel appointed for the
child if the parent is found to be financially able. Aside from
expense, the parent may desire to avoid losing further time off from
work or other obligations in order to attend for the hearings required
to resolve the child's delinquency case. The parent may miscalculate
the child's exposure to harsh punishment. Even absent special
conflicts, there is an abiding fundamental conflict of interest between
the parental role and the legal advisor role. A Louisiana case, State
v. Hudson,67 illustrates this problem. There when parental
consultation was provided, the parents urged their son to tell the truth
about the murder of which he was accused. They did not and
probably could not fully alert him about the consequences of a
confession in legal proceedings. They spoke in their role as moral
guardians rather than as legal counselors. The child dutifully
confessed, the confession was introduced at the hearing, and the court
found the murder allegation supported by the evidence. The
adjudication was affirmed on appeal.68
Most states have adopted a "juvenile totality of the
circumstances" rule that authorizes the trial court to consider all
factors that may be relevant to the determination of whether the
waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. Thus, there need be no
documentation that any conference occurred between the child and an
adult, much less any assessment of the quality of the advice given by
the adult. The gains of an all inclusive factor rule are offset by the
loss of guidance to a trial court and, more importantly, there is little
to suggest that current court processes can capture even the most
critical factors affecting the child's need for counsel. The system
itself feeds on waivers. As one Louisiana juvenile court judge
testified before the Juvenile Justice Commission:
[C]ourts cannot realistically assess whether the parent has
forced the child to agree to waive counsel in the proverbial
"night before court" family meeting. Sometimes the parent's
motive will be to help assure that the child will "get what he
deserves." The parent may, on the other hand, more benignly
adopt a "go along to get along" approach in the often
La. Ch. Code art. 810(C).
66. La. Ch. Code art. 809(C)..
67. 404 So. 2d 460 (La. 1981). 1).
68. Faced with a criminal accusation against their child, parents can experience
explosive emotions-anger, guilt, frustration, and shame-and those emotions may
override the parent's conflicting desire to protect the child. In Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 301, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1289 (1985), when told of his son's burglary
arrest, the father "became quite agitated, opened the rear door of the car [in which
the police were transporting his son to jail] and admonished his son: 'I told you that
you were going to get into trouble. You wouldn't listen to me. You never learn."'
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mistaken hope that the child will thereby receive a more
lenient sentence. In many cases the child and the parent may
both be intimidated by the Court system and personnel so that
they will agree to almost anything to "put an end" to the
whole ordeal. Unfortunately, of course, this is only the
beginning of the ordeal for the child.
Too often, the decision to waive counsel is not the child's
or the parent's. The System encourages or intimidates the
family and child to waive counsel. The system participants
do so because it is more convenient for the System. It is
easier for the Judge, District Attorney and probation officer to
have their way if the System is not burdened with the child
having an attorney.... The System promotes the child's "right"
to waive counsel because it is in the prosecutor's best interest,
not because it promotes the child's legal interests. The best
interest of the child never requires waiver of his right to
counsel.69
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE BATTLE
In retrospect, Gault was the highwater mark of political rhetoric
calling for greater protection of children who had gone astray. The
social contrast between 1964 and 2004 is mirrored by the two
juvenile constitutional cases then pending before the Supreme Court
in those years. In 1964 Gerald Gault was accused of silly, adolescent
prankish behavior; forty years later, the Court contemplated whether
a state could execute Tommy Simmons who was accused of murder.70
The "war on crime" burst on the political scene, bringing with it a
deluge of "get tough" legislation about crime, much of which was
aimed at juveniles and the juvenile court in response to fears of an
adolescent criminal insurrection.71
In 1993, for the first time in the history of the juvenile courts, the
Louisiana Legislature mandated the imposition of a fixed sentence for
juveniles found to have committed certain serious offenses.7 2
Juvenile court judges were thus stripped of their dispositional
69. Testimony of Judge Paul Young, see supra note 49.
70. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). The issue before the court was
whether one convicted of a capital crime committed before he was seventeen years
old can be put to death. By a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court
determined that capital punishment for those under the age of eighteen is
unconstitutional.
71. Thomas J. Bernard, The Cycle of Juvenile Justice 146-47 (1992).
72. La. Ch. Code art. 897.1 (added by 1993 La. Acts No. 430, § 2). The
offenses were first or second degree murder, aggravated rape, aggravated
kidnaping, armed robbery, or treason. Id.
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prerogative and required to impose a "juvenile life" term of
incarceration (until age twenty-one) in a "secure detention facility"
which, in reality, was an institution with banks of cells, centered in a
compound surrounded by patrolled barbed wire fences, a prison by
another name. In 1995, Human Rights Watch charged that Tallulah,
the most notorious juvenile facility located in Tallulah in the
northeast corner of the state, and other state juvenile institutions
violated international human rights standards.73 Solitary confinement,
euphemistically known as "individual rooms" or "isolation rooms,"
was rather routinely used: more than forty percent of Tallulah's youth
had been locked up in these cells at some point during their
incarceration, some for as long as twenty-three and a half hours at a
time.74 While the public might tolerate some "get tough" sanctions
for juvenile offenders, accounts of violence and abusive practices at
secure juvenile institutions began to leak out and shocked many
citizens who began to call for official accountability. In 1996 and
1997, the United States Department of Justice charged that the
conditions at Tallulah violated the United States Constitution;75 it
filed suit on July 9, 1998, against all four of Louisiana's youth
prisons, charging sexual abuse and assault at all four of Louisiana's
youth facilities. The Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana filed its
own class action challenging confinement conditions.76
The "juvenile lifers" were not the only juveniles placed by the
Department of Public Safety & Corrections in a secure institution.77
73. David Utter, Youth Prison Carries on a Legacy of Corruption, The Times-
Picayune, Nov. 4, 2002.
74. David Utter, Tallulah's Luxuries Nothing to Brag About, The Times-
Picayune, Jan. 27, 2003.
75. Carl Ginsberg & Helen Demeranville, Sticks and Stones: The Jailing of
Mentally 11l Kids, The Nation, Dec. 20, 1999, at 17, 18.
76. Brian B. v. Stalder, CA No. 98-886-B-Mi (M.D. La. 1998), consolidated
with Williams v. McKeithen, No. 71-98-B (M.D. La. 1971) (a preexisting consent
decree involving the conditions of the confinement at all adult and juvenile
institutions in the state) and United States v. Louisiana, No. 98-947-B 1 (M.D. La.
1998) (filed by the Department of Justice).
77. The juvenile courts are authorized to impose any of a range of dispositions
for juvenile offenders, for an indeterminate period of time, though short of the
maximum term which a similarly convicted adult would serve or age twenty-one,
whichever occurs first. La. Ch. Code arts. 898 (duration of disposition based on a
felony-grade adjudication) & 900 (duration of disposition based on a misdemeanor-
grade adjudication). In ascending order of severity, the courts' placement options
include probation supervision, day programs offering education and group therapy,
specialized foster homes for mentally ill delinquents, community group residential
homes and finally, commitment to the Department of Public Safety & Corrections.
La. Ch. Code arts. 897 (disposition after adjudication of a felony-grade delinquent
act) & 899 (disposition after adjudication of a misdemeanor-grade delinquent act).
If the court decides to commit a child to the department's custody, the department
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More than seventy percent of Tallulah's youth had been sent there for
non-violent offenses, such as joy-riding or drug addiction.78 Even
though the Children's Code still admonished the court to impose "the
least restrictive disposition" authorized by the Code,79 by 2000, sixty
percent of the 1,743 juveniles who were imprisoned in a juvenile
secure facility were incarcerated for non-violent offenses.8° Charges
of racism further charged the movement for reform. Over-
representation of African American juveniles in the prison population
is clear. Looking only at children in secure state custody, eighty-one
percent (1,425) were African-American.8
Finally, a juvenile judge in New Orleans refused to send any
more delinquents to Tallulah, and the hearings to modify their
commitment orders revealed brutality by prison guards, extensive
abuse of inmates and nothing that remotely resembled the "treatment"
and "rehabilitation" promised by the law.82 The drumbeat began to
close Tallulah, the most notorious prison in the state. The
Department of Justice opened an investigation as part of the prison
conditions suit still pending after many years in the federal district
83court. The Tallulah scandal brought many critics, including
powerful legislators like Senators Donald Cravins and Mitch
Landrieu, to an investigation of the entire juvenile justice system that
spawned places like Tallulah.
assumes decision-making authority and responsibility for deciding whether to place
the child in a secure institution, nonsecure facility, or some specialized program
offered by a private organization under contract with the department. The court
may recommend alternative care other than institutionalization, but the department
may reject its recommendation. La. Ch. Code art. 908. See also State in re Sapia,
397 So. 2d 469 (La. 1981).
78. Utter, supra note 74.
79. La. Ch. Code art. 901(B)..
80. Celeste, supra note 36, at 38
81. Utter, supra note 74. At least on this issue, Louisiana is not aberrant.
National research confirms that African-American youth are shockingly over-
represented among both detained and incarcerated youth. In 1997, minority youth
represented almost two-thirds (63%) of detained or committed juveniles although
they represented only about one-third of the total adolescent population in the
country. Id. See Celeste, supra note 36.
82. See supra note 23. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirned Judge Doherty's ruling, and the Department then sought
an injunction from the federal district court, claiming that the juvenile court was
attempting to relitigate claims that were part of the settlement in federal litigation
between the State and the Department of Justice. The federal court declined to
intervene. See Judge Refuses to Intervene in La. Juvenile Prison Case, American
Press, March 23, 2003, at 2A; Kevin McGill, Court Upholds Teen's Release, The
Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), Nov. 9, 2002, at 9B; Joe Gyan, Jr., Judge Frees
Youth, Blasts Prison, The Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), Dec. 20, 2001, at 6B.
83. See Utter, supra note 74. See also Vicki Ferstel, "State to settle prison
suits," The Advcoate, Baton Rouge, La., September 8, 2000, at IA.
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In 2001, the American Bar Associations's Juvenile Justice Center
published an empirical study documenting the plight of children in
the Louisiana juvenile justice system that expanded the scope of
public concern beyond conditions of confinement at the states's
juvenile institutions. As part of a nationwide study, the Louisiana
report concluded that the right to counsel appointment process in
many juvenile courts was a charade.84 Investigators found that
waivers of counsel by accused delinquents or their families occurred
in one-third to two-thirds of the cases, depending upon the judicial
district. In some districts, waivers occurred in ninety to ninety-five
percent of the cases.
In his address before the 2001 legislature, Chief Justice Calogero
called for legislative reform of the juvenile justice system.85 The
legislature responded by creating the Juvenile Justice Commission
which over the course of the next sixteen months held twenty-one
public meetings in communities throughout the state.86
While the Commission was hearing public testimony, the
MacArthur Study was published which discovered substantial
cognitive impairment of juveniles found to be delinquent in four
scattered sites: Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Florida and Virginia.87 In
matters regarding trial-related understanding and reasoning about
important information, researchers found that significant numbers of
adolescents were only able to perform at a level of adults found
mentally incompetent to stand trial. If Due Process forbids the trial
of an incompetent adult,88 how can proceedings with similar
consequences be faced by incompetent children? Compounding the
incompetencies of many juveniles who are arrested and face trial are
the universal, physiological handicaps of adolescents. In a
neurological mapping study conducted by the National Institute of
84. Celeste, supra note 36 at 59-60.
85. See supra note 6; see also Juvenile Justice Reforms Urged, The Advocate
(Baton Rouge, La.), Apr. 16, 2003, at 17A.
86. Id. at 3.
87. The MacArthur Report is so named because it was a study funded by the
MacArthur Foundation. It was an impeccably designed nationwide empirical study
comparing the decision-making ofjuvenile delinquents with comparison groups of
uncharged juveniles living in the community at large, adults in prison and
uncharged adults living in the community at large. In all, there were 1,350 subjects.
In matters of trial-related understanding and reasoning about important information
only thirty percent of eleven to thirteen-year-olds, nineteen percent of fourteen to
fifteen-year-olds, and twelve percent of sixteen to seventeen-year-olds were
incompetent using the legal test for competency. See Grisso et al., Juveniles'
Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison ofAdolescents 'andAdults'Capacities
as Trial Defendants, 27 Law & Hum. Behav. 333 (2003).
88. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788 (1960). See Godinez
v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993) (holding that the same standards
govern competency to waive trial counsel).
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Mental Health, involving one thousand healthy children and
adolescents, researchers used M.R.I. technology to study the
developmental stages of the human brain and found that the
maturation process does not end until the mid-twenties.89 Higher
brain functions, including empathy, analysis, judgment and the related
ability to assimilate information from various parts of the brain are
the work of the prefrontal cortex which is the last part of the brain to
develop. 90 As one researcher succinctly put it, "[I]t doesn't make
sense to ask the average adolescent to think or act like the average
adult, because he or she can't-anymore than a six-year-old child can
learn calculus."9' As a recent brief filed by the American Medical
Association summed up these data, "Normal adolescents cannot be
expected to operate with the level of maturity, judgment, risk version
or impulse control of an adult.
92
Not surprisingly, researchers at Louisiana State University found
that a large percentage of incarcerated juveniles in Louisiana suffered
from mental illness or from a learning disability. One-third of all
adjudicated juvenile offenders who are committed to the state have a
diagnosis of serious mental illness, and an additional six percent are
diagnosed with mental retardation. Sixty-four percent of these
floundering in the deepest end of the juvenile justice system have a
substance abuse or dependence diagnosis.93 These data reinforced
89. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence, 58 Amer. Psychologist 1009 (2003); Paul Raeburn, Too Immature for
the Death Penalty?, The New York Times Magazine, Oct. 17, 2004 (summarizing
studies); Shannon Brownlee, Inside the Teen Brain, U.S. News & World Report,
Aug. 9, 1999.
90. Elizabeth Sowell, et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post Adolescent Brain
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 Nature Neuroscience 10 (1999). (The
frontal lobe is likened to the CEO of the body, enabling a mature individual to
prioritize thoughts, imagine, think in the abstract, anticipate consequences, plan and
control impulses.)
91. Laurence Steinberg, Juveniles on Trial: MacArthur Foundation Study
Calls Competency into Question, ABA Criminal Justice Magazine 20, 22, Fall
2003.
92. Brief of Amici Curiae, American Medical Association et al., Roper v.
Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). Similar findings were reported by Louisiana
State University researchers.
93. Debra K. DePrato, Characteristics of Youth in Secure Care (Admits
between Jan. 1, 2004 - Dec. 31, 2004), LSU Health Sciences Center, School of
Public Health (2005). Despite these diagnoses, treatment was rare in the juvenile
institutions. The Department of Justice found that at Tallulah, juveniles with
extensive psychiatric histories who self-mutilate or threaten suicide had never been
referred to a psychiatrist. Id. at 18. Celeste, supra note 36 at 38. See also David
Utter, "Youth Prison Carries on a Legacy of Corruption," The Times-Picayune,
November 4, 2002. The Department of Justice estimates that 60 percent of
incarcerated youth across the nation have a recognizable mental disorder and that
as many as 200,00 are seriously mentally ill. Carl Ginsberg & Helen Demeranville,
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concerns not only about the maltreatment of mentally compromised
children in prison but also their protection by counsel in juvenile
court. Because the Louisiana Children's Code unequivocally states
that a child who may be mentally ill cannot waive counsel,94 the high
incidence of mentally ill children adjudicated in juvenile court
coupled with a high incidence of counsel waivers clearly signaled that
the fact-finding component of the counsel waiver process was badly
awry in many juvenile courts.
Perhaps emboldened by Chief Justice Calogero but a stunning
stance regardless of the cause, the state's juvenile judges refused to
defend the status quo of the courts' operations. The Louisiana
Council of Juvenile & Family Court Judges and the Louisiana City
Judges Association unanimously voted to send a Resolution of
Support to the Juvenile Justice Commission urging, among other
reforms, that "all judges with juvenile jurisdiction to, first, ensure that
youth are adequately represented at every critical sta e of the process
and, second, prohibit the routine waiver of counsel. '" This defection
of their strongest allies left the district attorneys politically weakened
as they struggled to convince the public and reform leaders that all
was well in the juvenile justice system. The prosecutors disclaimed
all culpability. In their minority report dissenting from the
recommendation of the Juvenile Justice Advisory Board calling for
non-waiver of counsel, the District Attorneys Association argued that
occasional "abuses of discretion" by trial court judges in allowing
children to waive their right to counsel "should be directly
addressed,"96 rather than forcing systemic change through legislation.
But as one judge responded, their stance
. . . implies that children. should seek appeals or writ
applications from the appellate courts. However, when a
court allows a child to waive counsel, there is no attorney
available to the child to file appeals or writ applications on
this or any other issue. There is no effective way to "directly
address" the improper allowance of waiver of counsel.97
An updated 2002 survey conducted by the ABA confirmed that
abuse of the waiver process was far from occasional. It found that
Sticks and Stones: The Jailing of Mentally Ill Kids, The Nation 17, 17 (Dec. 20,
1999).
94. La. Ch. Code art. 810(D).
95. This Resolution of Support for the Juvenile Justice Commission's Efforts
to Reform the Louisiana Juvenile Justice System was adopted by each group in their
annual joint meeting in New Orleans on January 10, 2002. A copy of the
Resolution is on file with the first author.
96. Testimony of Judge Paul Young, supra note 49.
97. Id.
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"an extremely high incidence of waiver" by children in Louisiana
juvenile courts continued and noted further that "many of [these
accused delinquents] waive without speaking to a lawyer or
understanding the critical consequences of their decision,""8 despite
the unambiguous obligation of the juvenile court judge to conduct a
searching inquiry into both voluntariness and understanding. In
addition, the report found that there was an extremely high use of
pleas to handle cases ofjuvenile delinquency, even those of a serious
nature, and frequently the pleas were entered without consultation
with counsel.99
The Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, a private non-profit
organization in New Orleans, played a pivotal role in generating
support for reform. It provided case studies from its files to put flesh
and blood on the abstraction of a lack of counsel. Two examples may
suffice here.
T.F., male, 14 years old at the time of disposition, Madison
Parish. T.F. was adjudicated ungovernable and placed under
FINS... custody at age 13. He was sent to Christian Acres, a
group home in Tallulah. While at Christian Acres, at age 14,
T.F. was charged with aggravated arson after he accidentally
caused a fire by smoking in a closet. T.F. was brought to
court on these charges in Tallulah, far from his home in
Morgan City. He had no family members present and did not
have an attorney. T.F. did not understand what was
happening in court; he just remembers that the judge asked
him if he did "it" and he responded "yes." T.F. was
adjudicated delinquent of aggravated arson and sentenced to
two years in secure custody.
Had T.F. had an attorney appointed to represent him, the
lawyer could have advised him regarding the implications of
pleading guilty and of his chances of being acquitted at trial
for the accident. Since T.F. had no family present, an attorney
could also have provided him with support and understanding
of his situation. In addition to actually representing him at
trial, given the facts, an attorney may have secured a plea for
a lesser charge. An attorney also could have presented
98. ABA Juvenile Justice Center, The Children Left Behind: A Review of the
Status of Defense for Louisiana's Children and Youth in Delinquency Proceedings
(Annual Update, 2002).
99. Id.
100. "FINS" is the acronym for a Families in Need of Services proceeding, Title
VII of the Louisiana Children's Code. It is the less serious, status offense category
of juvenile court jurisdiction that includes running away, truancy, and other age-
limited offenses as well as ungovernability.
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information about T.F.'s family and background and
advocated for a more appropriate sentence.
S.K., female, 14 years old at time of disposition, Evangeline
Parish. At age 14, S.K. was adjudicated delinquent for
unauthorized use and careless operation of a motor vehicle.
These charges were her first offenses; S.K. had never served
time, been on probation or been offered any rehabilitative care
services before this case. S.K. cannot recall formally waiving
counsel; she says simply that the court proceedings were very
brief. S.K. was committed to secure-care custody for a period
of two years and served her full time, despite efforts to secure
an early release. An attorney at the adjudication stage of
S.K.'s case could have advocated for probation and other
court services for S.K. since the offense was her first.'
Ultimately, the Commission recommended that waiver of counsel
be further studied and reformed, if necessary. After receiving the
Commission's report, the 2003 legislature acknowledged as one of
many principles that "certain changes in law concerning waiver of
counsel.., are necessary, ' 2 though it referred the fashioning of the
critical elements of that reform to the Children's Code Advisory
Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute for
recommendations. 103
While changes were being debated, a stunning event occurred
bringing a new reform ally. In February, 2004, the Civil Rights
Division of the United States Department of Justice formally notified
the Governor that the Department was opening an investigation "into
whether juveniles with cognitive impairments are waiving their right
to counsel in delinquency proceedings in violation of the United
States Constitution and federal law."'
101. "Individual Youth Betrayed by Counsel Waiver," case studies presented by
the Post-Disposition Project of the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana to the
House Committee on Administration of Criminal Justice, May 12, 2004. Copy on
file with the first author.
102. H.C.R. 56 at 5, Reg. Sess. (La. 2003). See supra note 6.
103. Id. at 12.
104. Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General to Gov. Mike
Foster (Feb. 27, 2003) (on file with the first author). An agreement settling the
investigation was finally achieved June 8, 2004. Memorandum from Chief Justice
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. to Judges of the District Courts, City Courts, Parish Courts
and Juvenile Courts (June 18, 2004). The Supreme Court agreed to develop
training materials and training sessions on the conduct of appropriate waiver
inquiries for all judges exercising juvenile jurisdiction within nine months and to
provide instructional materials to newly elected trial judges within ninety days of
their taking office. In addition, the Court agreed to design and implement a
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The following year, the Institute's proposal was presented as
House Bill 1508. It sought recognition of an absolute, nonwaivable
right to counsel for all accused delinquents, regardless of the grade
of the offense. The idea of an unwaivable professional
representative was not new.1"5 Anyone untrained in the law is at
risk in appearing without counsel at trial, but an uncounseled child
is even more vulnerable. A half-century ago, the President's Crime
Commission recommended that "Counsel be appointed as a matter
of course wherever coercive action is a possibility, without
requiring any affirmative choice by child or parent."' 1 6 The reform
bill moved smoothly through the Louisiana House of
Representatives, but then reached the fortifications of the
prosecutors. The district attorneys demanded a compromise while
the measure was pending in the Senate. The compromise was to
recognize an absolute right to counsel in three categories of cases:
when the child is charged with a felony-grade offense; when there
is a recommendation in a pending case that the child be placed in a
mental institution or substance abuse facility or a modification of
such a previous disposition; or when the child is confronted with
probation or parole revocation.1"7 In all other delinquency
proceedings, that is misdemeanor-grade offenses, an adult
consultation rule would be used, requiring a showing before
acceptance of any waiver of counsel that the child has consulted
with either an attorney, parent or caretaker.' The troublesome
former language permitting consultation with "an adult interested
in the child's welfare" would be repealed. Finally, both the child
and consulting adult must have been instructed by the court about
the child's rights and the consequences of a waiver of counsel. The
compromise was accepted, the amended bill was approved by the
Senate, confirmed by the House-Senate Conference Committee, and
signed by the Governor on July 6, 2004.
monitoring and accountability program that would collect data concerning waivers
of counsel and report to the Department on a semi-annual basis.
105. That an immature minor cannot and should not speak for himself or bear
responsibility for making unadvised judgments, even those affecting his own well
being or property, is as old as Roman law. For a recitation of many modem
instances in which a child cannot make choices or be bound by his agreements, see
Brobst, supra note 47.
106. National Crime Commission Report (quoted inIn re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38,
87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967)).
107. La. Ch. Code art. 810(D), revised by Acts 2004, No. 776.
108. "Caretaker" is a word of art defined elsewhere in the Children's Code as
"any person providing a residence for the child or any person legally obligated to
provide or secure adequate care for a child, including a parent, tutor, guardian or
legal custodian." La. Ch. Code art. 728(1).
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V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS: COUNSEL AT THE POLICE STATION
In public presentations of the Law Institute proposal of an
absolute, unwaivable right to counsel, the question inevitably was
asked whether the sponsors envisioned that pretrial interrogations
would be affected by the proposed change. °9 Would this statutory
change mean that, in assessing the admissibility of a juvenile's
confession, the Louisiana Supreme Court would be required to
abandon the totality of the circumstances rule that it announced in
Fernandez, and instead, require counsel during any interrogation
concerning a felony-grade offense? 10 The questioners were quite
right that the courts will soon have to address such a claim, and
sensible, yet conflicting, arguments can be advanced. If a child
cannot waive the assistance of counsel at trial, should she be able to
waive such assistance at pretrial confrontations, such as
interrogation? Aside from issues of consistent public policy,
consideration of legislative intent may turn on the meaning of "every
stage of proceedings" as used in article 809(A) and "at any stage in
the proceedings" as used in Children's Code article 810(B). One
could argue that "every stage of the proceeding" refers to judicial
proceedings-formal proceedings in the juvenile court-and not
pretrial processes."'
On the other hand, another could assert that, as a constitutional
term of art, the right to counsel attaches at "critical stages of the
prosecution" and thus applies to interrogations in the Miranda sense
that a caution about the right to counsel must be given before any
custodial interrogation. As the Supreme Court finally recognized in
the 1960s, the fifth and sixth amendment guarantees, though certainly
trial-rooted by language and history, can be meaningless protections
if police are free to exploit pretrial vulnerabilities of citizens and use
uncounseled, unknowing confessions taken in pretrial interrogations
as evidence to support a conviction. Yet in none of the dozens of
confession cases decided from 1930 to 1960 did the Supreme Court
base a confession decision on the privilege against self-
109. Other less important issues also arise with the recognition of an absolute,
unwaivable right to counsel. After appointment of and consultation with counsel,
does the child retain the right to disagree with counsel's advice? Contrary to
counsel's advice, could the child give an admissible confession or testify at trial?
Could the child enter a guilty plea against counsel's advice? Could a child dismiss
assigned counsel?
110. State v. Fernandez, 1996-2719 (La. 1998), 712 So. 2d 485.
111. A similar argument was made that a right to counsel "at all stages of any
proceedings" guaranteed by the Uniform Juvenile Court Act was limited only to
courtroom proceedings. That interpretation was rejected inIn the Interest ofJ.D.Z.,
431 N.W.2d 272 (N.D. 1988).
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incrimination." 2 Instead, the Court used the Due Process Clause or
increasingly, the sixth amendment. In the two years before Miranda,
the Court appeared to be inexorably moving toward a requirement
that counsel be provided before trial if the police wanted to
interrogate a suspect." 3 However, after wrestling with an issue so
fraught with social divisiveness and practical difficulties, the Court
finally resisted requiring that counsel must be appointed and present
at any interrogation of an adult accused. Instead, it sought a middle
course in Miranda, requiring only that warnings be given to a
questioned suspect. Warnings were thought to be an adequate proxy
for the advice and protection that counsel would offer if at the side of
the defendant during the interrogation.' 14 Is the same approach
warranted for juveniles?
The analysis begins with whether the Miranda warnings are even
required for accused juveniles. Remarkably, the Supreme Court has
never explicitly ruled on the issue. Indeed, in a footnote in a later
case, the court cautioned that it had reserved the question of whether
Miranda applies "with full force to exclude evidence obtained in
violation of its proscriptions from consideration in juvenile
proceedings."'," However, under the Louisiana Constitution and the
Children's Code, Miranda warnings are clearly required before a
juvenile is interrogated in pretrial custody.116 In State ex rel. Dino,
the Court noted that the state must prove that the juvenile "was
112. Jerold H. Israel, et al., Criminal Procedure and the Constitution: Leading
Supreme Court Cases and Introductory Text 332 (2002).
113. InMassiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 210, 84 S. Ct. 1199 (1964), the Court
ruled that a confession was inadmissible because it had been procured in violation
of the defendant's sixth amendment rights. An informant wired with a transmitter
had engaged the defendant in an incriminating conversation after the defendant had
been indicted and thus, his right to counsel had attached. Five weeks later, in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964), the Court again held that
the confession, though clearly voluntary in the absence of coercion sense, was
inadmissible because procured in violation of the defendant's asserted right to
counsel. Escobedo had retained counsel, though he had not yet been indicted nor
otherwise formally charged and was interrogated over his protests that he wanted
to consult with his lawyer.
114. Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868, 90 S. Ct. 140 (1966).
115. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 n.4, 99 S. Ct. 2560,2567 n.4 (1979).
116. To reach this conclusion requires a a two-step analysis. Article 1, sec. 13
ofthe Constitution explicitly requires the warnings be given to a criminally accused
upon either arrest or detention. In State ex rel. Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978),
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the state constitution "enhanced and
incorporated the prophylactic rules of Miranda v. Arizona" which apply equally to
criminal as well as delinquency proceedings. Article 808 of the Louisiana
Children's Code confirms this analysis: "All rights guaranteed to criminal
defendants by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Louisiana,
except the right to jury trial, shall be applicable in juvenile court proceedings
brought under this Title." La. Ch. Code art. 808.
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informed of his right against self-incrimination and to have an
attorney present at the interrogation; that he fully understood the
consequences of waiving those rights; and that he did in fact waive
those rights voluntarily and without physical or mental coercion.""' 7
The giving of Miranda warnings contributes to an assurance that
a confession is both knowing and voluntary. In the latest articulation
of voluntariness as the only required predicate for admissibility of an
adult's confession," " the Supreme Court held that the defendant must
show the use of coercive police activity.1 9 As Chief Justice
Rehnquist elaborated in Colorado v. Connelly,20 significantly a case
involving the proffered confession of a mentally compromised adult:
While each confession case has turned on its own set of
factors justifying the conclusion that police conduct was
oppressive, all have contained a substantial element of
coercive police conduct. ... [A]s interrogators have turned
to more subtle forms of psychological persuasion, courts have
found the mental condition of the defendant a more
significant factor in the "voluntariness" calculus.... But this
fact does not justify a conclusion that a defendant's mental
condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official.
coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry into
constitutional "voluntariness." 121
Connelly might seem to foreclose the use of any categorical
requirement like age to justify requiring special rules. Certainly it
would foreclose any claim that a child per se was incapable of giving
a voluntary confession. Nevertheless, special scrutiny of a child's
confession, or even requiring the presence of counsel during any
interrogation of a child, might be a rule that could survive Connelly.
Furthermore, the mental incapacity of a particular accused child if
exploited by the police should surely invalidate his confession taken
during an interrogation.'22
117. Dino, 359 So.2d at 589 (La. 1978).
118. Of course, the defendant's waiver after receiving Miranda warnings must
be proved if the confession resulted from custodial interrogation.
119. In Connelly, the Court shifted from a test of whether a confession was the
product of a "rational intellect and free will" to the oppressiveness of police
conduct. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 159, 107 S. Ct. 515, 518 (1986).
The prosecution must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 163-164 (citations omitted).
122. In Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 105 (1985) (cited with apparent approval
in Connelly), the Court had observed: Due process commands that "certain
interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique
characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of
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In its early confession cases, the Court seemed to embrace the use
of extraordinary scrutiny in determining the voluntariness of a
juvenile's confession. In 1948, the Supreme Court warned that
admissions and confessions of juveniles must be voluntary and
require special caution. In Haley v. Ohio, 13 the court reversed a
conviction of a fifteen-year-old for murder and observed:
[W]hen, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is
before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used.
•... [The youth] needs counsel and support if he is not to
become the victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs
someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of
the law, as he knows it, crush him. 24
Though the Miranda warnings provide scant protection even for
a rational adult against police overreaching, they provide nothing to
an incompetent adult or child, especially a developmentally impaired
child whose mechanism for self-preservation is distorted or
nonexistent. Yet their comprehension of the Miranda warnings' is
essential to their serving as a caution.125 Giving the warnings to an
individual with impaired comprehension is as effective as pouring
water into a bucket that has holes in it. Thus, traditionally the
Supreme Court has held that in order for any waiver of the Fifth
Amendment to be accepted, the trial court must find that it is not only
voluntarily given but knowingly given as well. 126 In Gault,127 the
Court held that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
is applicable in juvenile proceedings "as it is with adults" and
required clear and unequivocal evidence that the admission was made
with knowledge that the juvenile was not required to speak, nor
would he or she be penalized for maintaining silence. Citing Haley,
the Court noted "formidable doubt" about the reliability and
trustworthiness of children's confessions.
Is it possible that today's children are more sophisticated and
mature than were the children of the 1960s? Certainly the MacArthur
justice that they must be condemned." Cited in Connelly at 163.
123. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 598(1948).
124. Id. at 599-600. See also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962)
(reversing the conviction, finding a fourteen-year-old's confession inadmissible
using a rule of special scrutiny).
125. In Connelly, the court did not reach the issue of whether the mentally
compromised defendant could "knowingly" waive his Fifth Amendment rights. The
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan emphasizes that an intelligent waiver cannot
be sustained when the suspect is mentally ill or developmentally disabled. Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515, (1986).
126. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938).
127. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1458 (1967).
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Report would suggest not. While environmental factors such as
greater mobility, experience, education and the wider world of
television may contribute to a veneer of sophistication, the physiology
is unchanged: the mental wiring of adolescents is no more complete
now than it was forty years ago. This conclusion was reached in an
empirical study specially focused on the ability of juveniles to
understand their Miranda rights. Grisso and his co-authors found
age-related developmental disabilities: juveniles under the age of
fifteen demonstrate incompetence to waive their rights to silence and
legal counsel; juveniles aged fifteen and sixteen who have IQ scores
of eighty or below display similar incompetence and one-third of
those with higher IQs were incompetent. 128 Other reports confirm the
lack of understanding. For example, asked to explain what "you have
the right to remain silent" meant, one fourteen year old adolescent
responded with "Don't make noise."' 29 The special vulnerabilities of
children and adolescents, even without further disabilities due to
mental retardation or illness, make them especially susceptible to
interrogation techniques that are coercive or deceptive. 130 The IJA-
ABA Juvenile Justice Standards consequently require consultation
with counsel before a juvenile is questioned after arrest.131
In 1998, mirroring the public shift toward treating juveniles with
greater accountability, the Louisiana Supreme Court removed its
rather modest safeguard for the admissibility of a juvenile's pretrial
confession, that "the child engaged in a meaningful consultation with
an attorney or an informed 2 parent, guardian, or other adult
128. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 1134 (1980). See also National Association
ofCounsel for Children, Access to Justice for Children: Child's Law Manual Series
36 (2003) (citing studies).
129. MartyBeyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study
of] 7 Cases, ABA Criminal Justice Magazine, Summer 2000, at 27, 28.
130. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891 (2004) (analyzing, among others, seven
demonstrably false confessions from juveniles).
131. IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Relating to Police Handling of
Juvenile Problems Standard 3.2(b) and (c).
132. In State ex rel. Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978), the Louisiana Supreme
Court led by Justice Dennis rejected the totality of circumstances test whereby a
juvenile might be sufficiently mature to unilaterally waive his or her rights. Instead,
it required that the state must affirmatively show that the juvenile "engaged in a
meaningful consultation with an attorney or an informed parent guardian or other
adult interested in his welfare." Id. at 594. Both the parents and the juvenile must
be given the Miranda warnings, and the juvenile must be permitted to consult
privately with the adult about waiver decision-making. This stance would appear
to be in accord with the dictum of the Supreme Court in Gault. See supra note 32
and accompanying text.
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interested in his welfare." '133 In its place the court in State v.
Fernandez 134 substituted the always vague juvenile totality of
circumstances test, which it termed the "majority" American view.'35
The opinion hints that the totality standard used to evaluate the
voluntariness of adult confessions is to be supplemented by some
additional inquiry:
A confession by a juvenile given without a knowing and
voluntary waiver can be, and should be, suppressed under the
totality of circumstances standard applicable to adults,
supplemented by consideration of other very significant
factors relevant to the juvenile status of the accused.'36
The court did not elaborate nor otherwise identify factors unique
to juvenile offenders. Nevertheless, the caution to consider any
special juvenile vulnerabilities in assessing admissibility takes on
added force in light of the MacArthur report and similar studies
reinforcing the real and very troubling mental and psychological
vulnerabilities of children and adolescents. 137
In itsjuvenile cases, the United States Supreme Court consistently
has used a three-pronged analysis in determining the constitutional
rights of accused delinquents: What is the adult rule? Is there any
adequate substitute for a procedural protection that is unique to the
juvenile court? Is there any distinction between the status of a child
or adult 3 ' or the context of a case, such as a school environment, 139
that would make the extension of adult protections inappropriate? If
not, then the guarantee is extended. Aside from the imposition of
capital punishment, 4 ' the Court has never addressed, except
133. Dino, 359 So.2d at 594.
134. 1996-2719 (La. 1998), 712 So. 2d 485.
135. Id. at 989-90. What may have been the majority view at the time of
Fernandez, before the release of the MacArthur Report, may not still exist today as
courts become more aware of the universal mental deficits of young adolescents.
136. Id. at 489.
137. For persuasive criticism of the Fernandez decision, see Brobst, supra note
47.
138. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984) (approving
preventive detention for a juvenile due to the child's lack of full liberty of
movement). But see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2094
(1987) (where the court subsequently embraced the same policy for adults, finding
that due process was not offended in either case).
139. See Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1989) (finding a
lesser set of first amendment rights of school children); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (permitting searches by school officials on
reasonable suspicion due to the officials' need to maintain discipline and provide
protection to all students).
140. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). The issue before the court was
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obliquely in its early confessions cases, whether an accused child is
ever entitled to greater protection under the Constitution than an
accused adult. There is some evidence that a majority of the current
court might find commonly shared adolescent characteristics
enough to justify greater protection when the purpose of the law is
to make reasonable inferences about understanding of rights and
their waiver. 41
The extension of the policy of an absolute right to counsel in
felony-grade cases to pretrial interrogations is not the only new
issue raised by the 2004 revision of article 810, but it is by far the
most important. 42 The impact of requiring counsel when police
interrogate a child held in custody would send aftershocks into
every police station in the state. Alternatively, a court might find
that adequate protection would be afforded by lesser measures such
as requiring actual consultation with counsel before interrogation or
requiring that the child be formally advised of his rights by the court
before any interrogation occurs outside the presence of counsel. 143
whether one convicted of a capital crime committed before he was seventeen years
old can be put to death. By a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court
determined that capital punishment for those under the age of eighteen is
unconstitutional.
141. In Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004), the
Court considered whether the adult standard for determining "custody" for purposes
of triggering Miranda rights was applicable to a seventeen-year-old who was
questioned by police. Four members of the Court refused to use a special rule but
instead said the proper test was whether a "reasonable person" would have felt he
or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation. Justice O'Connor specially
noted in her concurrence that the juvenile here was only months away from the age
of majority. The four dissenters suggest that age is relevant to a determination of
one's freedom of action. In clearer examples of differences in adult and juvenile
capabilities, such as waiver decisions, the dissenters might be more forceful in
insisting upon greater protection for less competent persons.
142. An ambiguity exists concerning when the absolute right to counsel is
triggered. Louisiana Children's Code article 810(D) prohibits waiver when the
child is "charged with" a felony-grade delinquent act. La. Ch. Code art. 810(D).
Usually, the provisions of the delinquency title of the Children's Code refer to
"alleging" a delinquent act or that a child is "accused of' some delinquent act;
"charging" is less frequently used, though it does appear in Article 845(C),
"Contents of petition." Counsel is clearly required as long as a pending petition
asserts a felony-grade offense, but what if the child is charged with a felony but is
willing to enter an admission to a lesser-included misdemeanor? Will counsel be
required? The proper answer is that counsel should be required because
technically, the formal charge remains a felony-grade offense. More importantly,
counsel should be appointed to consult with any child before the critical decision
is made to enter an admission. To do otherwise would subvert the policy of
enhanced respect for the child's need of representation.
143. For all the reasons previously advanced, consultation with a parent or
caretaker is an inadequate precaution for a child facing pre-trial interrogation.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Many believe that "the only possible way to protect juveniles'
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is through [legislation
or jurisprudence] that define[s]an absolute unwaivable right to
counsel. ... "" Most blue ribbon commissions have endorsed the
reform: The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice,'45 the National Advisory Committee on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,146 The American Bar
Association-Institute of Judicial Administration,'47 and the Juvenile
Justice Center of the American Bar Association,'48 to name just a few.
In recognizing an absolute right to counsel in felony-grade offenses,
the Louisiana Legislature entered the vanguard of the reform
movement.
In a poor state with ajuvenile justice system starved for resources,
any allocation of public funds for lawyers to represent accused
delinquents may seem to be a frivolous policy-a policy that only
lines the pockets of greedy lawyers, or worse, a policy that wastes
precious public resources. Surely it is wiser to use those funds for
additional services for community alternatives to lock-ups for
children, or for additional mental health treatment for children, or for
preventive delinquency programs to salvage as many as possible of
the delinquents who are victims of dysfunctional families? All those
lost causes and lost children might be found. But the simple truth
seems to be that, without child advocates, the funds for lawyers
would never be reallocated-the system would never change. A
lawyer representing a particular child in the juvenile court is the best
catalyst for reform. Legislators, legislation drafters, judges, probation
officers, social workers and other child advocates certainly contribute
to reform, but the most important ombudsmen for accused delinquent
children are all those conscientious lawyers, most of whom serve
with little or no pay, who agree to accept an appointment and
faithfully represent children. "' The public is excluded from most
144. Shepherd, supra note 7.
145. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 87 (1967).
146. Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
212 (O.J.J.D.P., Washington, D.C. 1976).
147. Juvenile Justice Standards Relating to Pretrial Court Proceedings 89
(1980).
148. A Call for Justice (1995).
149. Securing adequate funding for indigent juvenile defense remains an
unsolved need although at its last two sessions, the legislature assigned a special
Task Force on Indigent Defense Services. S.R. 112 and H.R. 151 (2003 Reg.
Sess.); S.C.R. 136 (2004 Reg. Sess.) The House ofDelegates ofthe Louisiana State
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juvenile court proceedings. 5 ° A lawyer for an accused child serves
many important functions, perhaps the most important of which is to
ensure that any trial is fairly and constitutionally conducted. Without
representation for a particular set of charges, the child's needs may
not be known until after he or she is incarcerated and thus, the holes
in the community's services and resources that might have
rehabilitated the child will never be perceived. Counsel can ensure
that a child who appears to be incompetent to stand trial is adequately
evaluated or that the mental or physical disabilities of the child are
diagnosed. Counsel can negotiate for diversion from a formal trial,
for less severe charges or a less severe disposition. Counsel can insist
that the appropriate disposition is matched to the child's needs, if the
child is found "guilty."
Requiring counsel in serious delinquency cases is a reform step
that must precede even critical issues of how the state is to fund its
indigent defender services or otherwise underwrite the expenses of
appointed counsel in private practice.'51 As Justice Kennedy
observed in the majority opinion in Roper v. Simmons, children who
commit crimes are constitutionally distinguishable from adults: "[a]
lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions." '52 Although the role of the
juvenile court is to serve as a "protecting parent rather than a
prosecutor,"'53 in actuality children have been made victims of the
very system that was created to decrimininalize them. Requiring
counsel is the keystone in salvaging the integrity of Louisiana's
juvenile courts, the safety of its juvenile institutions, the expansion of
treatment alternatives and community resources, and to recovering all
the children who might otherwise grow up as "lost causes."
Bar Association adopted a similar resolution urging the appointment of a Blue
Ribbon Commission to develop a strategic plan for indigent defense reform and a
timetable for implementation (June 12, 2003, cited in S.C.R. No. 136). More
important is the acknowledgement in the latest resolution creating the task force that
quality of representation is essential to a creditable system and can only be
achieved through the allocation of sufficient resources to provide competitive
salaries, continuing professional education, limited caseloads, adequate supervision
and other quality control monitoring. S.C.R. 136 (2004 Reg.Sess.).
150. La. Ch. Code art. 407(A) (the public is excluded from all delinquency trials
except charges of crimes of violence or second or subsequent felony-grade
offenses).
151. See supra note 149.
152. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005) (citing Johnson v. Texas,
509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).
153. Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760, 765 (1965).
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